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Abstract
In 2018, the ICJ rendered a judgment in Bolivia v. Chile that effectively denied
the status of the doctrine of legitimate expectation as a customary international
law. The ICJ’s judgment came as a surprise to many in the international
arbitration community because a whole host of international tribunals
established under various investment treaties have found that this doctrine, as
well as the broader principle of “fair and equitable treatment,” has effectively
attained the status as the “minimum standard of treatment” under customary
international law. Given the lack of elaborated reasoning, however, the ICJ’s
ruling fails to resolve the recurring debate over the legal status of the doctrine.
This paper addresses this issue squarely, by first examining the historical
development and the nature of the doctrine, and then the conflicting lines of
jurisprudence that arose out of a number of investment arbitrations. Thereafter,
this paper attempts to provide an answer to the longstanding question as to
whether the doctrine of legitimate expectation has now attained status as
customary international law. Finally, based on a systematic analysis of various
investment treaties and numerous arbitral awards from the perspective of public
international law, this paper tackles the old conundrum by providing a
pragmatic guidance on ascertaining applicable legal tests for the “minimum
standard of treatment” under contemporary customary international law.
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I.

INTRODUCTION
On October 1, 2018, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) rendered
its judgment in the case of Obligation to Negotiate Access to the Pacific
Ocean (Bolivia v. Chile).1 The judgment contained many significant
findings, but one particular finding drew attention from the international
arbitration community. That is, the ICJ for the first time rendered its finding
on the contested doctrine of legitimate expectation, a principle that has long
been considered to form an essential aspect of the international investment
law requiring host states to accord “fair and equitable treatment” to foreign
investors. In response to Bolivia’s invocation of this doctrine, the ICJ ruled
as follows:
The Court notes that references to legitimate expectations may be
found in arbitral awards concerning disputes between a foreign
investor and the host State that apply treaty clauses providing for fair
and equitable treatment. It does not follow from such reference that
there exists in general international law a principle that would give
rise to an obligation on the basis of what could be considered a
legitimate expectation.2

Nevertheless, Bolivia had good reasons to invoke the doctrine of legitimate
expectation before the “World Court.” As elaborated in this paper, Bolivia’s
invocation of “legitimate expectation” as a doctrine under customary
international law does not strike as a surprising attempt to the international
arbitration community. International tribunals established under various
* Haneul Jung is currently an independent arbitrator and commentator. Prior to commencing
an independent career, he was Director of Trade Dispute Settlement Division, Ministry of
Trade, Industry & Energy of the Republic of Korea and a partner at the International Dispute
Resolution Practice Group, Shin & Kim LLC. Nu Ri Jung is currently Associate Professor in
the Division of International Studies at Ewha Womans University and the corresponding
author. All of the opinions expressed herein are strictly those of the authors, and must not be
attributed to the Government of the Republic of Korea or Ewha Womans University.
1
Obligation to Negotiate Access to the Pacific Ocean (Bol. v. Chile), Judgment, 2018
I.C.J. Rep. 153 (Oct. 1, 2018).
2
Id. para. 162. Note that the ICJ’s ruling is not a perfect example of clarity. For
example, it is unclear what exactly the ICJ meant by “general international law”; does it
mean international law other than the investment treaties in general, or a more specific
source such as customary international law? As enshrined in Article 38 of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice (ICJ Statute), the primary source of international law
comprises international conventions (e.g., treaties), “a general practice accepted as law,” and
“the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations.” Considering that the ICJ
juxtaposed investment treaties with the “general international law,” the ICJ’s reference to
“general international law” may mean either customary international law or general
principles of law (or both). In any case, international debates surrounding the doctrine of
legitimate expectation mostly concern the doctrine’s legal status as customary international
law.
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investment treaties have increasingly (although not uniformly) considered
this doctrine to have attained the status as the “minimum standard of
treatment” under customary international law. Given that the ICJ’s twosentence ruling on “legitimate expectation” in Bolivia v. Chile does not
offer much analysis, the international debate on the legal status of
“legitimate expectation” remains unresolved.3
This paper examines the contested doctrine of “legitimate expectation”
squarely, and seeks to draw an answer to the long-lasting debate over the
status of this doctrine as customary international law. For that, this paper
first observes the historical development and the nature of the “legitimate
expectation” doctrine, and then evaluates the conflicting lines of
jurisprudence that arose out of a number of investment treaty arbitrations.
Thereafter, this paper attempts to answer the longstanding question of
whether the doctrine of legitimate expectation has now attained a status of
customary international law. Finally, based on a systematic analysis of
various investment treaties and numerous arbitral awards rendered by
investment tribunals from the perspective of public international law, this
paper tackles the old conundrum by providing a pragmatic guidance on
ascertaining applicable legal tests for the “minimum standard of treatment”
under contemporary customary international law.
II. HAS THE DOCTRINE OF “LEGITIMATE EXPECTATION”
ATTAINED THE STATUS AS THE CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL
LAW STANDARD OF MINIMUM TREATMENT?
A. Legitimate Expectation as Part of the Fair and Equitable Treatment
The doctrine of legitimate expectation stems from international
investment law’s “fair and equitable treatment” (FET) standard.4 By
definition, the FET standard requires host states to accord “fair and
equitable treatment” to foreign investments within their territories.5 The

3
Tomáš Mach, Legitimate Expectations as Part of the FET Standard: An Overview of
a Doctrine Shaped by Arbitral Awards in Investor-State Claims, 2018(1) ELTE L. J. 105,
121 (2018) (“The nature of the origin of the doctrine of legitimate expectations remains
unclear in terms of the categorization of sources of norms (from the formal point of view)
under international law.”).
4
See Aceris Law LLC, Legitimate Expectations in Investment Arbitration, ACERIS LAW
(Oct.
14,
2018),
https://www.acerislaw.com/legitimate-expectations-in-investmentarbitration/ (“Today, arbitral tribunals consider almost unanimously that legitimate
expectations form part of the FET standard contained in the BITs and should be interpreted
within its limits.”); see also U.N. Conf. on Trade & Dev., Fair and Equitable Treatment:
UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements II, at 9, U.N. Doc.
UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2011/5
(2012),
https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/
unctaddiaeia2011d5_en.pdf [hereinafter UNCTAD FET].
5
Ying Zhu, Fair and Equitable Treatment of Foreign Investors in an Era of
Sustainable Development, 58 NAT. RESOURCES J. 319, 321 (2018).
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FET standard can be found in most existing investment treaties.6 Although
with varying languages, most investment treaties require a host state to
afford FET to investments from the other contracting state, in one way or
the other.7 Naturally, breach of the FET standard has long been the most
frequently referred basis for claims raised in investment arbitrations.8
Indeed, as the tribunal in AWG Group Limited v. The Argentine Republic
described, the FET standard has “an almost ubiquitous presence” in
investment arbitrations.9 The AWG tribunal further considered that the FET
standard has been so widely and generally used and so flexibly applied, that
this standard forms “a basic standard of treatment to be accorded to”
foreign investors.10 In the tribunal’s view, the fundamental purpose of
international investment law—promoting and protecting foreign
investment—could not be achieved without the FET standard.11 In this
light, the AWG tribunal went as far as to state that “it is no exaggeration to
6
See UNCTAD FET, supra note 4, at xiii (“The obligation to accord FET to foreign
investments appears in the great majority of international investment agreements (IIAs).”);
see also Theodore Kill, Don’t Cross the Streams: Past and Present Overstatement of
Customary International Law in Connection with Conventional Fair and Equitable
Treatment Obligations, 106 MICH. L. REV. 853, 854 (2008) (“Modern bilateral investment
treaties (‘BITs’) almost uniformly feature a provision that requires the host state to provide
“fair and equitable treatment” to the investors and investments of the other treaty party.”).
7
Some tribunals found that, depending on the specific treaty language, investment
treaties can extend FET obligations not only to investments that have been made, but also to
investments in the process of being made. In Nordzucker v. Poland, the tribunal focused on
the first sentence of Article 2(1) of the Germany-Poland BIT (i.e., “Each Contracting Party
shall in its territory promote as far as possible investments by investors of the other
Contracting Party and admit such investment in accordance with its respective laws.”),
which was juxtaposed with the second sentence of Article 2(1) (i.e., “Investments that have
been admitted in accordance with the respective law of one Contracting Party shall enjoy the
protection of its treaty.”). The third sentence of Article 2(1) provided that “Each Contracting
party shall in any case accord investments fair and equitable treatment.” The tribunal
considered that the second sentence concerns “investments made” that are subject to all the
provisions of the investment treaty, and that the first sentence concerns ‘investments in
making’ subject to the conditions enshrined in that first sentence. Thus, any ‘investment in
making’ must be admitted in accordance with the host state’s relevant laws as a matter of
treaty obligation. At the same time, by virtue of the expression of the phrase “in any case,”
the tribunal considered that the FET obligation in the third sentence also applies to
“investments in making” as well as to “investments made.” See Nordzucker v. Poland,
UNCITRAL, Partial Award (Jurisdiction), paras. 176-83 (Dec. 10, 2008).
8
See Zhu, supra note 5, at 321 (“Today, most bilateral and multilateral investment
treaties provide FET clauses, and FET has been the most frequently invoked standard in
investment arbitration.”); see also UNCTAD FET, supra note 4, at xiii (“Among the IIA
protection elements, the FET standard has gained particular prominence, as it has been
regularly invoked by claimants in investor-state dispute settlement (‘ISDS’) proceedings,
with a considerable of success.”).
9
AWG Group Ltd. v. The Arg. Republic, UNCITRAL, Decision on Liab., para. 187
(July 30, 2010) [hereinafter AWG Group Decision on Liab.].
10 Id. para. 188.
11 Id.
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say that the obligation of a host state to accord fair and equitable treatment
to foreign investors is the Grundnorm or basic norm of international
investment law.”12
In interpreting the meaning of the FET, tribunals primarily referred to
the ordinary meaning of the term “fair and equitable” pursuant to Article 31
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Thus, the tribunal in
MTD, for example, considered that “[i]n their ordinary meaning, the terms
‘fair’ and ‘equitable’ [] means ‘just,’ ‘even-handed,’ ‘unbiased,’
‘legitimate.’”13 Still, what constitutes such a “fair, equitable, just, evenhanded, unbiased, and legitimate” treatment is highly fact-specific.14
Tribunals repeatedly stressed that “[a] judgment of what is fair and
equitable cannot be reached in abstract; it must depend on the facts of the
particular case”15 and that “the standard is to some extent a flexible one
which must be adapted to the circumstances of each case.”16
In the course of applying the FET standard to the given facts of each
case by tribunals, however, the FET standard gave birth to a somewhat
concrete set of principles. Tribunals have found that the FET standard
entails various obligations owed to foreign investors by host states, such as
respecting foreign investors’ legitimate and reasonable expectations,
requiring good faith conduct, refraining from taking arbitrary or
discriminatory measures, and refraining from exercising coercion,
transparency, and due process, to name a few.17 Among such obligations,
the doctrine of respecting foreign investors’ legitimate expectations is
widely regarded as the “basic touchstone of fair and equitable treatment.”18
12

Id.
See, e.g., MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd. v. Republic of Chile, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/7,
Award, para. 113 (May 25, 2004); Azurix Corp. v. The Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/01/12, Award, para. 360 (July 14, 2006) [hereinafter Azurix Award]; Siemens A.G. v.
The Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Award, para. 290 (Jan. 17, 2007)
[hereinafter Siemens Award].
14 See AWG Group Decision on Liab., supra note 9, para. 188 (“[FET’s] application is
crucially dependent on an evaluation of the facts of each case.”).
15 Mondev Int’l Ltd. v. U.S., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2, Award, para. 118 (Oct.
11, 2002) [hereinafter Mondev Award].
16 Waste Mgmt. Inc. v. United Mex. States (“No. 2”), ICSID Case No. ARB/(AF)/00/3,
Award, para. 99 (Apr. 30, 2004) [hereinafter Waste Mgmt. II Award].
17 See, e.g., Bayindir Insaat Turizm Ticaret Ve Sanayi A.S. v. Islamic Republic of Pak.,
ICSID Case No. ARB/03/29, Award, para. 178 (Aug. 27, 2009); Sergei Paushok, CJSC
Golden E. Co. and CJSC Vostokneftegaz Co. v. Gov’t of Mong., Award on Jurisdiction and
Liab., para. 253 (Apr. 28, 2011); Deutsche Bank AG v. Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri
Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/2, Award, para. 420 (Oct. 31, 2012); Mobil Exploration
and Dev. Inc. Suc. Arg. and Mobil Arg. S.A. v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/16,
Decision on Jurisdiction and Liab., para. 914 (Apr. 10, 2013) [hereinafter Mobil Arg.
Decision on Jurisdiction and Liab.]; Jan Oostergetel v. The Slovak Republic, UNCITRAL,
Final Award, para. 221 (Apr. 23, 2012).
18 The tribunal in El Paso v. Arg. explicitly endorsed the claimant’s submission that the
basic touchstone of FET is to be found in legitimate and reasonable expectations of
13
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Thus, an FET standard “requires the Contracting Parties to provide to
international investments treatment that does not affect the basic
expectations that were taken into account by the foreign investor to make
the investment.”19 Stated differently, an FET obligation may be breached by
way of “frustrating the expectations that the investor may have legitimately
taken into account when making the investment.”20 A foreign investor may
derive legitimate expectations either from specific commitments made to it
by the host state with respect to the investment, or from general rules that
are put in place with a specific aim to induce foreign investments on which
the foreign investor reasonably relied in making the investment.21
Most investment tribunals nowadays consider that the doctrine of
legitimate expectation constitutes an important, if not the most important,
element of the FET standard.22 Regardless, being a byproduct of the FET
standard’s application to specific facts, the doctrine of legitimate
expectation should be examined and applied on a case-by-case basis. For
example, the tribunal in El Paso v. Argentina considered that “FET is
linked to the objective reasonable legitimate expectations of the investors
and that these have to be evaluated considering all circumstances.”23 In
principle, therefore, a tribunal should examine whether it would be fair and
equitable to honor the specific legitimate expectation that a foreign investor
had in connection with its investment in the host state. This examination
should inevitably involve evaluation of all pertinent facts.
However, investment tribunals are increasingly and mechanistically
applying the doctrine of legitimate expectation without going through the
process of interpreting and applying the FET clause to the specific facts at
hand.24 Despite there being disagreements,25 several tribunals went as far as
investors. See El Paso Energy International Company v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/03/15, Award, para. 339 (Oct. 31, 2011) [hereinafter El Paso Award]. See also Mobil
Arg. Decision on Jurisdiction and Liab., supra note 17, para. 914.
19 Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB
(AF)/002/2, Award, para. 154 (May 2003) (emphasis added).
20 Venezuela Holdings B.V. and others v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID
Case No. ARB/07/27, Award, para. 256 (Oct. 9, 2014) (“The Tribunal will first consider the
alleged breach of the FET standard. In the Tribunal’s opinion, this standard may be breached
by frustrating the expectations that the investor may have legitimately taken into account
when making the investment.”).
21 See Isolux Infrastructure Netherlands, BV v. Kingdom of Spain, SCC Case No.
V2013/153, Award, para. 775 (July 12, 2016).
22 See, e.g., EDF (Services) Limited v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/13, Award,
para. 216 (Oct. 8, 2009) (“The Tribunal shares the view expressed by other tribunals that one
of the major components of the FET standard is the parties’ legitimate and reasonable
expectations with respect to the investment they have made.”).
23 El Paso Award, supra note 18, para. 364. See also Inversión y Gestión de Bienes,
IGB, S.L. and IGB18 Las Rozas, S.L. v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/17,
Award, para. 138 (Aug. 14, 2015).
24 Haneul Jung, Empirical Analysis of Rules of Extra-Textual Interpretation based on
the relevant WTO Jurisprudence, 1 TRADE LAW & POL’Y REV. 1, 13 n.40 (2021) (S. Kor.)
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to consider that the doctrine of legitimate expectation is not merely a
byproduct of applying the FET standard to particular facts of the case, but is
rather an indispensable component of the FET standard itself.26
B. FET Standard: An “Autonomous Treaty Obligation” or a “Customary
International Law”?
1. Historical Development
Most investment treaties that incorporate the FET standard use
expressions such as “fair and equitable treatment” to give effect to the FET
standard as a matter of autonomous treaty obligation.27 Meanwhile some
treaties adopt the FET standard by way of making reference to the
customary international law principle of “minimum standard of treatment”
(MST). The most representative example in this regard can be found in
Article 1105 (entitled “Minimum Standard of Treatment”) of the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).
Originally, Article 1105 of NAFTA provided, “[e]ach Party shall
(available in Korean), https://disputecase.kr/476?category=900436.
25 See AWG Group Decision on Liab., supra note 9, para. 3 (“The assertion that fair and
equitable treatment includes an obligation to satisfy or not to frustrate the legitimate
expectations of the investor at the time of his/her investment does not correspond, in any
language, to the ordinary meaning to be given to the term ‘fair and equitable.’”).
26 For example, the tribunal in Bau v. Thailand rejected as being “unacceptable” the
respondent’s argument that “the obligations of the host state towards foreign investors derive
from the terms of the applicable investment treaty and not from any set of expectations that
the investors may have or claim to have.” The tribunal then went on to find that “‘legitimate
expectations’ come within FET’s parameters.” See Werner Schneider, acting in his capacity
as insolvency administrator of Walter Bau Ag (In Liquidation) v. Kingdom of Thailand,
UNCITRAL, Award, para. 11.7 (July 1, 2009).
27 See UNCTAD FET, supra note 4, at xiv (“Historically, the FET standard–regardless
of how it is expressed–came into existence as an expression of the minimum standard of
treatment. However, where the FET obligation is not expressly linked textually to the
minimum standard of treatment of aliens, many tribunals have interpreted it as an
autonomous, or self-standing one. Instead of deriving the content of the standard from its
original source (customary international law), these tribunals chose to focus on the literal
meaning of the provision itself.”). It is particularly so in those BITs where the FET
provisions are simply stated without reference to other sources (e.g., international law
including customary international law). See, e.g., Article 3(2) of the 2003 Indian Model BIT
(“Investments and returns of investors of each Contracting Party shall at all times be
accorded fair and equitable treatment in the territory of the other Contracting Party.”);
Article 2(2) of the 2008 German Model BIT (“Each Contracting State shall in its territory in
every case accord investments by investors of the other Contracting State fair and equitable
treatment as well as full protection under this Treaty.”); Article 3(1) of the China-Zimbabwe
BIT (1996) (“Investments and activities with investments of investors of either Contracting
Party shall be accorded fair and equitable treatment and shall enjoy protection in the territory
of the other Contracting Party.”); Article 4(1) of the China-Switzerland BIT (2009)
(“Investments and returns of investors of either Contracting Party shall at all times be
accorded fair and equitable treatment and shall enjoy full protection and security in the
territory of the other Contracting Party.”).
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accord to investments of investors of another Party treatment in accordance
with international law, including fair and equitable treatment and full
protection and security.”28 Article 1105 of NAFTA was soon revised
following three arbitral awards (i.e., Metalclad,29 S.D. Myers,30 and Pope &
Talbot31) that basically interpreted Article 1105 of NAFTA as incorporating
the autonomous FET standard. Although the facts of these cases were all
substantially different,32 each of these tribunals found that the scope of
Article 1105 was broad, and thus that its protection of foreign investors had
been breached.33 The three tribunals found that “fair and equitable
treatment” in Article 1105 of NAFTA constituted an independent standard
well above the historical minimum standard under customary international
law.34
On 31 July 2001, in the midst of the Pope & Talbot arbitration, the
Free Trade Commission (FTC) established under the auspice of NAFTA
adopted a binding interpretive statement–referred to as “Notes of
Interpretation” (Notes)–on Article 1105 of NAFTA. The Notes provide, in
relevant part, that: “Article 1105(1) prescribes the customary international
law minimum standard of treatment of aliens as the minimum standard of
treatment.”35 Subsequently, it further provides that the concepts of “fair and
equitable treatment” and “full protection and security” do not require
treatment in addition to, or beyond, the treatment required by customary
international law to comply with the MST.36 Some commentators criticize
that the FTC’s authoritative interpretation effectively amends NAFTA text;
they argue that any textual amendment that did not go through the formal
28 North American Free Trade Agreement, Can.-Mex.-U.S., art. 1105, Dec. 17, 1992, 32
I.L.M. 289 (1993) (emphasis added).
29 See Metalclad Corporation v. The United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/
97/1, Award (Aug. 30, 2000).
30 See S.D. Myers Inc. v. Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, Partial Award (Nov. 13,
2000).
31 See Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, Award on the Merits
of Phase 2 (Apr. 10, 2001).
32 Michelle E. Gray, Broadening NAFTA Article 1105 Protections: A Small Price for
International Investment, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 383, 397 (2011) (noting that “[t]he Metalclad
arbitration concerned a disputed endeavor by Metalclad Corporation to develop and operate
a waste disposal facility in Mexico. The S.D. Myers arbitration involved an American
company located in Canada that was practically rendered obsolete because of a ban on the
exportation of a certain chemical substance. And the Pope & Talbot arbitration originated
from a dispute regarding Canada’s implementation of the Canada-U.S. Softwood Lumber
Agreement, which restrained the export of softwood lumber from certain Canadian
provinces”).
33 Id.
34 Steven R. Ratner, Regulatory Takings in Institutional Context: Beyond the Fear of
Fragmented International Law, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 475, 514 (2008).
35 NAFTA FTC, Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions, § B, July 31,
2001 (emphasis added).
36 Id.
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treaty amendment process is invalid.37 In practice, however, investment
tribunals have generally respected the FTC’s interpretive authority.38 For
example, the tribunal in Mondev v. U.S.A. held that the Notes had resolved
that Article 1105 refers to customary international law and not any
autonomous treaty obligation.39
In fact, the Notes expressly construed that the FET provision in Article
1105 of NAFTA requires only “the customary international law minimum
standard of treatment and does not require any standard of treatment that
goes beyond that.”40 The difficulty with this line of thinking, however, is
that it presupposes the existence of a general consensus as to what
constitutes the MST of aliens under customary international law.41
Unfortunately, the reality is that the MST standard is highly indeterminate,
lacks clearly defined content, and requires interpretation.42 Even the Notes
that expressly limited the scope of the FET standard enshrined in Article
1105 of NAFTA to the customary international law standard of MST failed
to definitively resolve the riddle. Many investment tribunals continued to
find that the FET as confined to customary international law’s MST
standard still provides the foreign investors protections essentially
equivalent to the autonomous FET standard.
2. Conflicting Jurisprudences
There is a widely shared understanding that the original principles of
the MST standard as part of customary international law are captured by the
1926 arbitral award in Neer (U.S.A.) v. Mexico.43 In the Neer arbitration, the
United States claimed that Mexico had breached its international obligation
37 Jason Webb Yackee, Controlling the International Investment Law Agency, 53 HARV.
INT’L L.J. 391, 441 (2012).
38 Id.
39 Ratner, supra note 34, at 514. See also Mondev Award, supra note 15, paras. 121-22
(“[The FTC] makes it clear that Article 1105(1) refers to a standard existing under
customary international law . . . [T]he FTC interpretation makes it clear that in Article
1105(1) the terms ‘fair and equitable treatment’ and ‘full protection and security’ are, in the
view of the NAFTA Parties, references to existing elements of the customary international
law standard and are not intended to add novel elements to that standard.”).
40 Valentina S. Vadi, Towards a New Dialectics: Pharmaceutical Patents, Public Health
and Foreign Direct Investments, 5 NYU J. INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. 113, 167 (2015).
41 UNCTAD FET, supra note 4, at 28.
42 Nevertheless, from the perspective of host states, linking the FET standard to the
MST of aliens may be seen as a progressive development, given that this will likely induce
tribunals to apply higher thresholds to find a breach, as compared with the so-called
autonomous FET standard. Id. at 28-29.
43 L. F. H. Neer & Pauline Neer v. United Mexican States, 4 Rep. Int’l Arb. Awards 60,
60-66 (Oct. 15, 1926) [hereinafter Neer Award]. The Neer case is generally considered to
constitute the starting point for the international discussion of the standard of treatment for
aliens, although Neer did not involve the concept of FET in the context of an investor-state
dispute. See Christoph Schreuer, Fair and Equitable Treatment in Arbitral Practice, 6(3) J.
WORLD INV. & TRADE 357, 368 (2005).

198

Minimum Standard of Treatment Under Customary International Law
42:189 (2022)

to accord the MST to the U.S. citizens due to the Mexican authorities’
“unwarrantable lack of diligence or an unwarrantable lack of intelligent
investigation” into the murder of an American, Paul Neer, on Mexican
soil.44 In rejecting the United States’ MST claim, the General Claims
Commission that adjudicated the matter (Neer Commission) applied the
following legal test to determine violation of an MST obligation: “the
treatment of an alien, in order to constitute an international delinquency,
should amount to an outrage, to bad faith, to willful neglect of duty, or to an
insufficiency of governmental action so far short of international standards
that every reasonable and impartial man would readily recognize its
insufficiency.”45 In accordance with the approach of the Neer Commission,
the MST was long deemed to protect foreign investors “only in instances of
“egregious and shocking” conduct or “manifestly unfair or inequitable
conduct.”46
Yet, “the content of the minimum standard should not be rigidly
interpreted, and it should reflect evolving international customary law.”47
The customary international law standard of MST must have evolved since
1926. One of the most significant evolutions in international law in the past
century has been its increasing focus on the rights of individuals, leading to
“major international conventions on human rights as well as to the
development of rules of customary law in this field.”48 Thus it would be
reasonable to assume that such an overall evolution must have also led to
the improvement of the MST, applicable to nationals and foreigners alike.49
In this light, many tribunals have ruled that the MST standard of today
offers broader protection than what the Neer Commission found back in
1926.50 Indeed, there is a line of arbitral findings that the contemporary
44

Neer Award, supra note 43, at 61.
Id. at 60-61. Note that the Neer Commission laid out this standard through a
discussion on “denial of justice”. See Aceris Law LLC, Denial of Justice in Investment
Arbitration – Claims Commissions, L. Fay H. Neer and Pauline Neer (USA) V. United
Mexican States, ACERIS LAW (Aug. 5, 2017), https://www.acerislaw.com/denial-of-justicein-investment-arbitration/.
46 Vadi, supra note 40, at 167.
47 Int’l Thunderbird Gaming Corp. v. The United Mexican States, UNCITRAL, Arbitral
Award, para. 194 (Jan. 26, 2006).
48 Merrill & Ring Forestry L.P. v. Government of Canada, ICSID Case No. UNCT/07/1,
Award, ¶ 201 (Mar. 31, 2010) [hereinafter Merrill Award].
49 Id.
50 See, e.g., id. para. 213 (“[T]he applicable minimum standard of treatment of investors
is found in customary international law and that, except for cases of safety and due process,
today’s minimum standard is broader than that defined in the Neer case and its progeny.”);
Gold Reserve Inc. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/09/1,
Award, para. 567 (Sept. 22, 2014) [hereinafter Gold Award] (“As held by the tribunal in
Mondev when disregarding the Neer standard as controlling today, ‘both the substantive and
procedural rights of the individual in international law have undergone considerable
developments.’”); Anglo American PLC v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case
No. ARB(AF)/14/1, Award, para. 442 (Jan. 18, 2019) [hereinafter Anglo Award]; CC/Devas
45
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MST standard is no longer limited to conduct by host states that are
“outrageous” or “in bad faith” or “willful neglect of duty,” and that the
modern MST involves a more serious measure of protection,51 although a
number of tribunals effectively maintained the Neer standard by imposing
the burden of proof on claimants to demonstrate the precise content of the
MST standard under contemporary customary international law.52
That being so, tribunals and commentators have not been able to reach
a consensus on the relationship between the FET standard and the MST
standard. Common sense signals that the customary international law
standard of MST establishes a “floor” (and certainly not the “ceiling”) to
the FET standard even when the relevant investment treaty does not
explicitly confine the scope of the FET obligation to customary
international law. Although questions of the FET standard’s breach must be
examined on a case-by-case basis, the MST standard will almost always (if
not always) constitute the “minimum” or “floor” for the FET standard.53 To
many tribunals, the FET and MST standards were distinguishable both
legally and conceptually.54 A number of tribunals have thus explicitly
distinguished the FET standard as an autonomous treaty obligation from the
customary international law standard of MST, with the FET standard
encompassing the MST standard but also providing protections beyond the
MST standard.55
(Mauritius) Ltd., Devas Employees Mauritius Private Limited., and Telecom Devas
Mauritius Limited. v. The Republic of India, PCA Case No. 2013-09, Award on Jurisdiction
and Merits, para. 457 (July 25, 2016) [hereinafter Devas Award on Jurisdiction and Merits];
Waste Mgmt. II Award, supra note 16, paras. 92-3, 98; Mobil Arg. Decision on Jurisdiction
and Liab., supra note 17, para. 910.
51 See, e.g., Bilcon of Delaware et al. v. Government of Canada, PCA Case No. 200904, Award on Jurisdiction and Liability, para. 433 (Mar. 17, 2015); Chemtura Corporation v.
Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, Award, para. 215 (Aug. 2, 2010) [hereinafter
Chemtura Award]; Waste Mgmt. II Award, supra note 16, para. 93; Cargill, Incorporated v.
United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/05/2, Award (redacted version), para.
296 (Sept. 18, 2009) [hereinafter Cargill Award]; ADF Group Inc. v. United States of
America, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/00/1, Award, paras. 179-81 (Jan. 9, 2003) [hereinafter
ADF Award].
52 See, e.g., Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. United States of America, UNCITRAL, Award, paras.
22, 614-27 (June 8, 2009) [hereinafter Glamis Award].
53 See, e.g., Quiborax S.A., Non Metallic Minerals S.A. v. Plurinational State of Bolivia,
ICSID Case No. ARB/06/2, Award, para. 291 (Sept. 16, 2015); Enron Corporation and
Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Award, para. 258
(May 22, 2007); Joseph Charles Lemire v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/18, Decision
on Jurisdiction and Liability, para. 253 (Jan. 14, 2010); Adel A Hamadi Al Tamimi v.
Sultanate of Oman, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/33, Award, paras. 383-84 (Nov. 3, 2015).
54 See, e.g., Mondev Award, supra note 15, para. 116. It appears that the tribunal in
Mondev attempted to draw an interpretative guidance about the “fair and equitable
treatment” in the context of the contemporary international law as developed since Neer.
55 See, e.g., OperaFund Eco-Invest SICAV PLC and Schwab Holding AG v. Kingdom
of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/15/36, Award, para. 425 (Sept. 6, 2019) (“(FET) is
mentioned expressly as a separate obligation . . . . The express inclusion of this commitment
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At the same time, however, there is also a whole host of cases in
which investment tribunals held that the autonomous FET standard and the
contemporary MST standard are essentially the same. To be clear, the
relevant tribunals’ views in this regard are also slightly diverging from one
another. For example, some tribunals such as the ones in Genin v. Estonia56
or Siemens v. Argentina57 basically considered the FET and MST to be
legally the same, while other tribunals such as the ones in Saluka v. Czech
Republic58 or Azurix v. Argentina59 considered that they are legally
. . . also clarifies that its standard is autonomous, and beyond the MST.”); Tethyan Copper
Company Pty Limited v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/1, Decision
on Jurisdiction and Liability, para. 807 (Nov. 10, 2017) (“[T]he Tribunal considers the
absence of any reference to international law . . . as a strong indication that the Contracting
Parties did not intend to limit the FET standard contained therein to the minimum
standard.”); Oko Pankki Oyj, VTB Bank (Deutschland) AG, and Sampo Bank Plc v. The
Republic of Estonia, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/6, Award, paras. 230, 238 (Nov. 19, 2007)
(“[T]he Tribunal considers that the FET standard in the Estonia-Germany BIT bears an
autonomous meaning and that it is not to be assimilated to the lesser minimum standard of
treatment under customary international law. . . . Whilst, in the Tribunal’s view, its meaning
significantly overlaps with the minimum standard under customary international law, this
FET standard clearly provides a greater protection for the foreign investor.”); Crystallex
International Corporation v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/11/2, Award, para. 530 (Apr. 4, 2016) (“The Tribunal is of the opinion that the
FET standard embodied in the Treaty cannot–by virtue of that formulation or otherwise–be
equated to the ‘international minimum standard of treatment’ under customary international
law, but rather constitutes an autonomous treaty standard.”); Adel A Hamadi Al Tamimi v.
Sultanate of Oman, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/33, Award, para. 384 (Nov. 3, 2015) (“Breach
of the minimum standard of treatment thus requires more than a minor derogation from the
ideal standard of perfectly fair and equitable treatment.”); Deutsche Telekom AG v. The
Republic of India, PCA Case No. 2014-10, Interim Award, para. 331 (Dec. 13, 2017) (“The
Tribunal observes that the BIT does not refer to ‘international minimum standard’ or similar
formulations, unlike other treaties. The BIT simply speaks of ‘fair and equitable treatment.’
The question is thus what ‘fair and equitable’ means.”).
56 Alex Genin, Eastern Credit Limited, Inc. and A.S. Baltoil v. The Republic of Estonia,
ICSID Case No. ARB/99/2, Award, para. 367 (June 25, 2001) (“Under international law
[fair and equitable treatment] is generally understood to ‘provide a basic and general
standard which is detached from the host State’s domestic law.’ While the exact content of
this standard is not clear, the Tribunal understands it to require an “international minimum
standard” that is separate from domestic law, but that is, indeed, a minimum standard. Acts
that would violate this minimum standard would include acts showing a willful neglect of
duty, an insufficiency of action falling far below international standards, or even subjective
bad faith.”).
57 Siemens Award, supra note 13, ¶¶ 291-300.
58 Saluka Inv. B.V. v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, paras. 286-95 (Mar.
17, 2006) [hereinafter Saluka Partial Award].
59 Azurix Award, supra note 13, ¶ 361 (“The last sentence ensures that, whichever
content is attributed to the other two standards, the treatment accorded to investment will be
no less than required by international law. The clause, as drafted, permits to interpret fair and
equitable treatment and full protection and security as higher standards than required by
international law. The purpose of [this] sentence is to set a floor, not a ceiling, in order to
avoid a possible interpretation of these standards below what is required by international
law. While this conclusion results from the textual analysis of this provision, the Tribunal
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distinctive.60 At any rate, even the tribunals that considered the autonomous
FET standard and the customary MST standard to be legally distinctive
from each other still considered that the “actual content” of the FET
standard is not materially different from the “content” of the MST under
customary international law. The tribunal in Rosoro Mining v. Venezuela
even found that the MST “has developed and today is indistinguishable
from the FET standard and grants investors an equivalent level of
protection.”61 The tribunal in Rumeli v. Kazakhstan went further by finding
that the perceived difference between the FET standard and the MST
standard “is more theoretical than real.”62 Several other arbitral tribunals
have also considered that the actual content of the FET standard is not
different from the content of the MST as it evolved under customary
international law.63
The tribunals that endorse the liberal scope of the customary
international law standard of MST tend to find the driver of the MST’s
evolution from the autonomous FET standard itself. As early as 2002, the
tribunal in Pope v. Canada considered that relevant state practice
demonstrates the evolution of the MST standard as customary international
law.64 The tribunal in Pope v. Canada particularly noted that the number of
investment treaties then effective was in excess of 1,800 already and that
the relevant state practice in the field of international investment law is
“now represented by those treaties.”65 The tribunal in OAO Tatneft v.
Ukraine likewise considered that “[e]ven though fair and equitable
treatment is not always regarded as an integral part of customary law, it
does not consider that it is of material significance for its application of the standard of fair
and equitable treatment to the facts of the case. As it will be explained below, the minimum
requirement to satisfy this standard has evolved and the Tribunal considers that its content is
substantially similar whether the terms are interpreted in their ordinary meaning, as required
by the Vienna Convention, or in accordance with customary international law.”).
60 See Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd. v. United Republic of Tanzania, ICSID Case No.
ARB/05/22, Award, ¶ 589 (July 24, 2008) [hereinafter Biwater Award].
61 Rusoro Mining Ltd. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/12/5, Award, ¶ 520 (Aug. 22, 2016) (emphasis added).
62 Rumeli Telekom A.S. and Telsim Mobil Telekomunikasyon Hizmetleri A.S. v.
Republic of Kazakhstan, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/16, Award, ¶ 611 (July 29, 2008).
63 See, e.g., Deutsche Bank AG v. Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID
Case No. ARB/09/2, Award ¶ 419 (Oct. 31, 2012); EDF Int’l S.A., SAUR Int’l S.A. and
León Participaciones Argentinas S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/23,
Award, ¶ 999 (June 11, 2012); Biwater Award, supra note 60, ¶ 592; Duke Energy
Electroquil Partners & Electroquil S.A. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No.
ARB/04/19, Award, ¶ 337 (Aug. 18, 2008); Cargill, Inc. v. Republic of Poland, ICSID Case
No. ARB(AF)/04/2, Final Award, ¶ 453 (Feb. 29, 2008); CMS Gas Transmission Co. v.
Republic of Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award, ¶ 284 (May 12, 2005)
[hereinafter CMS Award].
64 Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, Award in Respect of
Damages, ¶ 59 (May 31, 2002) [hereinafter Pope Award in Respect of Damages].
65 Id. ¶ 62.
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reflects the evolution that the very rules of customary law have experienced
in the light of current treaties and jurisprudence.”66
In addition, the tribunal in ADF Group v. U.S.A. held that judicial or
arbitral case laws could also form the basis for the evolving customary
international law standard of the MST.67 Perhaps the tribunal in the 2016
case of Murphy v. Ecuador most aptly summarized the underlying rationale
by the investment tribunals that foster this line of reasoning:
The international minimum standard and the treaty standard continue
to influence each other, and, in the view of the Tribunal, these
standards are increasingly aligned. This view is reflected in the
jurisprudence constante not only of NAFTA caselaw, as discussed
above, but also in the arbitral caselaw associated with bilateral
investment treaties. Some tribunals have gone so far as to say that
the standards are essentially the same. The Tribunal finds that there
is no material difference between the customary international law
standard and the FET standard under the present BIT.68

As a corollary of the foregoing approaches, the doctrine of legitimate
expectation, which is the “basic touchstone” and the key component of the
FET standard, has also been found to constitute a part of the customary
international law principle of MST by the relevant tribunals.69
In sum, contrary to the ICJ’s ruling in Bolivia v. Chile, many arbitral
66 OAO Tatneft v. Ukraine, PCA Case No. 2008-8, Award on the Merits, para. 481 (July
29, 2014) [hereinafter OAO Award on the Merits].
67 ADF Award, supra note 51, para. 184.
68 Murphy Exploration & Production Company International v. Republic of Ecuador,
PCA Case No. 2012-16, Partial Final Award, para. 208 (May 6, 2016).
69 See, e.g., The Rompetrol Group N.V. v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/3,
Award, para. 197 (May 6, 2013) (“The Tribunal . . . sees no benefit in engaging in an
abstract debate as to whether Article 3(1), and in particular its reference to ‘fair and
equitable treatment,’ was or was not intended by the Parties simply to incorporate the
‘minimum standard’ under customary international law, still less to engage in any debate as
to what that ‘minimum standard’ should now be understood to be. It prefers instead . . . to
follow the ordinary meaning of the words used, in their context, and in the light of the object
and purpose of the BIT. In doing so, it will take into particular account the two general
elements that other tribunals have found come into play in connection with claims to ‘fair
and equitable treatment,’ namely the way in which the foreign investor or the foreign
investment have been treated by the organs of the host State, measured against the
expectations legitimately entertained by the foreign investor in making that investment.”);
Waste Mgmt. II Award, supra note 16, para. 98 (“[T]he minimum standard of treatment of
fair and equitable treatment is infringed by conduct attributable to the State and harmful to
the claimant . . . In applying this standard it is relevant that the treatment is in breach of
representations made by the host State which were reasonably relied on by the claimant.”);
Siemens Award, supra note 13, para. 299 (“[T]o the extent that it has been an issue, the
tribunals concur in that customary international law has evolved . . . That tribunal also
understood that the conduct of the State has to be below international standards . . . and that
. . . the current standard includes the frustration of expectations that the investor may have
legitimately taken into account when it made the investment.”).
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tribunals considered that the FET standard, along with its “basic
touchstone” that is the doctrine of legitimate expectation, has now attained
the status of customary international law. This view is based on the state
practices as supposedly evidenced by thousands of investment treaties
enshrining the autonomous FET standard, as well as by the jurisprudence
constante established through the very line of arbitral awards endorsing the
liberal scope of the MST standard.70
3. Whether the Doctrine of Legitimate Expectation Falls Within the Scope
of the Customary International Law Standard of Minimum Treatment
As an initial matter, the notion that the scope of the contemporary
MST covers the doctrine of legitimate expectation as allegedly evinced by
the jurisprudence constante seems highly questionable. While decisions by
international tribunals can serve only as “subsidiary means for the
determination of rules of law” and not as international law itself,71 (as
described above) conflicting lines of jurisprudence adopted by several
investment tribunals, as well as by the ICJ in Bolivia v. Chile, exist.
Moreover, another notion that the sheer number of investment treaties
codifying the FET standard ipso facto represents the relevant “state
practice” (or opinio juris, for that matter) also appears to be questionable.
For starters, the investment tribunals that considered the MST standard
indistinguishable from the FET standard did not delve much deeper than
offering cursory references to the prevalence of the investment treaties
codifying the FET standard.72 In contrast, the ICJ in Bolivia v. Chile
summarily dismissed Bolivia’s position that the FET standard (along with
70 In addition, at least one tribunal indicated that the fact that the virtually identical role
is served by the FET standard and by the MST standard within the context of international
investment law could support the notion that their contents must be equivalent. See El Paso
Award, supra note 18, para. 336 (“[I]t is the view of the Tribunal that the position according
to which FET is equivalent to the international minimum standard is more in line with the
evolution of investment law and international law and with the identical role assigned to
FET and to the international minimum standard. The Tribunal wishes to emphasize what is,
in its view, the specific role played by both the general international minimum standard and
the FET standard as found in BITs. The role of these similar standards is to ensure that the
treatment of foreign investments, which are protected by the national treatment and the
most-favored investors’ clauses, do not fall below a certain minimum, in case the two
mentioned standards do not live up to that minimum.”). This particular reasoning, however,
appears to be both backward and circular in nature, if cited specifically, to endorse the
notion that the MST and FET standards are equivalent.
71 See Statute of International Court of Justice art. 38(1)(d), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat.
1055, 1 U.N.T.S. 993 [hereinafter ICJ Statute] (“The Court, whose function is to decide in
accordance with international law . . . shall apply . . . judicial decisions . . . as subsidiary
means for the determination of rules of law.”).
72 See, e.g., Pope Award in Respect of Damages, supra note 64, para. 62; ADF Award,
supra note 51, para. 184; OAO Award on the Merits, supra note 66, para. 481; Mondev
Award, supra note 15, paras. 116-17; Chemtura Award, supra note 51, para. 121; Merrill
Award, supra note 48, para. 193.
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the doctrine of legitimate expectation) has now attained the status of
customary international law by virtue of the prevalence of the investment
treaties codifying the FET standard.73 That much is clear. The ICJ did not
provide any elaborated reasoning to further support its finding. Still, the
ICJ’s underlying rationale can be unveiled through the specific sources of
law that it applies under the ICJ Statute, other generally accepted principles
of international law, and its previous judgments.
It is well-established that a customary international law will emerge
only where there is a widely shared “state practice” accompanied by opinio
juris, or an understanding that such practice is required as a matter of law.74
Indeed, Article 38(1)(b) of the ICJ Statute clarifies that an international
custom constituting international law is evidenced by “a general practice
accepted as law.”75 This fundamental requirement applies with equal force
to investment-treaty arbitrations both as a matter of international law and
practice. In United Parcel Service of America Inc. v. Canada, the tribunal
confirmed that “[t]o establish a rule of customary international law two
requirements must be met; consistent state practice and an understanding
that that practice is required by law.”76 As the U.P.S. tribunal specifically
observed, the ICJ in Libya v. Malta stressed that “[i]t is of course axiomatic
. . . that the material of customary international law is to be looked for
primarily in the actual practice and opinio juris of States.”77 According to
the U.P.S. tribunal:
[M]ultilateral treaties may have an important role in recording and
defining rules deriving from custom, or indeed in developing them.
That statement of principle demonstrates that the obligations
73 It is noteworthy that the ICJ judgement in Bolivia v. Chile does not categorically find
that there is no such a doctrine as the “legitimate expectation” under international law. See
Amy Sander, Obligation to Negotiate and Consult: Worthwhile Tool or Exercise in Futility?,
113 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 35, 42 (2019). Instead, the ICJ in Bolivia v. Chile considered
that arbitral awards upholding the doctrine based on the prevalence of the treaty clauses
providing for fair and equitable treatment do not turn this doctrine into an obligation under
customary (general) international law.
74 Int’l Law Comm’n, Draft Conclusions on Identification of Customary International
Law, with Commentaries, U.N. Doc. A/73/10, at 122-23 (2018) (“[T]he two constituent
elements of customary international law [are]: a general practice and its acceptance as law
(the latter often referred to as opinio juris).”). As two constituent elements of customary
international law, a general practice refers to the practice of state that contributes to the
formation, or expression, of rules of customary international law, and opinio juris means that
the practice in question must be undertaken with a sense of legal right or obligation. Id. at
130-38.
75 See ICJ Statute, supra note 71, art. 38(1)(b) (“The Court, whose function is to decide
in accordance with international law . . . shall apply . . . international custom, as evidence of
a general practice accepted as law.”).
76 United Parcel Service of America Inc. v. Government of Canada, ICSID Case No.
UNCT/02/1, Award on Jurisdiction, ¶ 84 (Nov. 22, 2002).
77 Id. (quoting Case Concerning the Continental Shelf (Libya v. Malta), Judgement,
1985 I.C.J. Rep. 13, 29-30, para. 27 (June 3)).
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imposed by customary international law may and do evolve. The law
of state responsibility of the 1920s may well have been superseded
by subsequent developments. It would be remarkable were that not
so. But relevant practice and the related understandings must still be
assembled in support of a claimed rule of customary international
law.78

A treaty obligation can “no doubt” become a part of customary
international law,79 and states’ manifested acceptance of certain legal
obligations by way of signing or ratifying relevant treaties can also provide
evidence of certain opinio juris.80 Nevertheless, while they may provide
evidence of legally binding custom, treaties do not create customary
international law per se.81 The fact that states have prevalently concluded
such treaties certainly does not per se establish that any obligation codified
therein (e.g., FET standard) arises out of a sense of legal obligation apart
from the autonomous treaty obligation. Quite the contrary could be true
because states may have concluded investment treaties containing the FET
standard due to their belief that no such legal obligation exists on its own
and thus they need to conclude a treaty to give legal effect to the FET
standard. It follows that evidence of legally binding custom including those
supposedly reflected by investment treaties must be weighed against other
relevant evidence.
Evidence contravening the particular notion that the MST standard and
FET standard are now essentially the same are ample and robust. As noted
by the tribunal in Amco v. Indonesia, the members of the United Nations
(U.N.) have rejected such presumptions as early as 1974.82 Indeed, Article 2
of the U.N. General Assembly Resolution No. 3281 (XXIX), entitled
“Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States,” provides in
unequivocal terms that every state is entitled to “freely exercise full
permanent sovereignty” in regards to its economic activities, and that “[n]o
state shall be compelled to grant preferential treatment to foreign
investment.”83 Furthermore, the U.N. members confirmed that foreign
78

Id.
See North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger. v. Den. & Neth.), Judgement, 1969 I.C.J. Rep.
3, 41, ¶ 71 (Feb. 28, 1969); BRIAN D. LEPARD, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW: A NEW
THEORY WITH PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS 191 (2010).
80 LEPARD, supra note 79, at 191-94.
81 Id. at 191.
82 Amco Asia Corp. v. Republic of Indonesia, ICSID Case No. ARB/81/1, Ad Hoc
Committee Decision on the Application for Annulment, ¶ 60 (May 16, 1986).
83 See G.A. Res. 3281(XXIX), Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, 29
U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 31, at 50-55, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (Dec. 12, 1974) (emphasis added):
79

Article 2
1. Every State has and shall freely exercise full permanent sovereignty,
including possession, use and disposal, over all its wealth, natural resources and
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investors including transnational corporations have no right to intervene in
the internal affairs of a host state, and with respect to any ‘taking,’ any
controversy “shall be settled under the domestic law of the nationalizing
State and by its tribunals” absent lex specialis allowing or requiring
otherwise.84
Even enthusiastic supporters of the notion that opinio juris can be
confirmed through signing or ratifying relevant treaties concur that “[U.N.
General Assembly resolutions] can be strong evidence” of the views of
U.N. member states, which, in turn, serve as “significant evidence of opinio
juris” expressed by the U.N. members on pertinent topics.85 The U.N.
General Assembly Resolution No. 3281 unequivocally indicates that states’
opinio juris in respect of “Economic Rights and Duties of States” does not
cover the understanding that the FET standard has attained customary
international law status. Moreover, there is no material evidence (other than
the perceived lex specialis that is investment treaties) supporting that the
understanding enshrined in the U.N. General Assembly Resolution No.
3281 has evolved or otherwise changed since 1974.
Furthermore, the MST is not a standard that applies to foreign
investments exclusively. Instead, the MST standard rather broadly concerns
overall individual rights, including more fundamental rights such as human
rights. In light of their “full” and “permanent” economic sovereignty, states
must enjoy broader discretion when it comes to their treatment of foreign
economic activities.
2.

Each State has the right:

(a)

To regulate and exercise authority over foreign investment within its
national jurisdiction in accordance with its laws and regulations and in
conformity with its national objectives and priorities. No State shall be
compelled to grant preferential treatment to foreign investment;

(b)

To regulate and supervise the activities of transnational corporations within
its national jurisdiction and take measures to ensure that such activities
comply with its laws, rules and regulations and conform with its economic
and social policies. Transnational corporations shall not intervene in the
internal affairs of a host State. Every State should, with full regard for its
sovereign rights, co-operate with other States in the exercise of the right set
forth in this subparagraph;

(c)

To nationalize, expropriate or transfer ownership of foreign property, in
which case appropriate compensation should be paid by the State adopting
such measures, taking into account its relevant laws and regulations and all
circumstances that the State considers pertinent. In any case where the
question of compensation gives rise to a controversy, it shall be settled
under the domestic law of the nationalizing State and by its tribunals, unless
it is freely and mutually agreed by all States concerned that other peaceful
means be sought on the basis of the sovereign equality of States and in
accordance with the principle of free choice of means.

84
85

Id.
LEPARD, supra note 79, at 208-09.
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investments as compared to their treatment of more inherent rights of
individuals such as human rights.86 In other words, a distinction might have
to be drawn even within the MST standard between a treatment affecting a
foreigner’s fundamental rights and a treatment affecting a foreigner’s
investment rights. Yet, it appears that this important distinction has not
been properly reflected on in the context of investor-state disputes. Notably,
aside from their reliance on lex specialis, which is investment treaties, the
investment tribunals that basically equated the MST standard with the FET
standard have not been able to point to any general and actual “practice” of
states voluntarily affording the FET standard to foreign investors. In fact,
the tribunals that support the view that the MST standard has evolved to
offer virtually identical protection with that of the autonomous FET
standard have not presented “any evidence for their assumption that the
[investment protection treaty] network has contributed, in fact, to the
generation of customary law rules that could be taken into account within
the concept of the evolved minimum standard.”87 Quite the contrary is true
as, for example, the tribunal in Grand River v. U.S.A. confirmed what
appears to be a common-sense knowledge that “[s]tates discriminate against
foreign investments, often and in many ways, without being called to
account for violating the customary minimum standard of protection.”88
86 See, e.g., Ilias Bantekas, The Public Interest Perspective of International Courts and
Tribunals, 38 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 61, 73 (2021) (“The regulatory power of states visà-vis their investment obligations is not tantamount to the obligation of states (both the home
and host state) to fulfill their international human rights obligations under customary and
treaty law.”); Jack Alan Levy, As between Princz and King: Reassessing the Law of Foreign
Sovereign Immunity as Applied to Jus Cogens Violators, 86 GEO. L.J. 2703, 2705 n.19
(1998) (noting the ICJ’s holding in the Barcelona Traction case that: “while a state’s
protection of a person’s basic human rights is an absolute legal obligation erga omnes, its
treatment of foreign investment within its own territory is a qualified legal obligation”);
Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belg. v.
Spain), Judgement, 1970 I.C.J. Rep. 3, 32 (Feb. 5); Subrata Roy Chowdhury, Permanent
Sovereignty over Natural Resources: Substratum of the Seoul Declaration, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DEVELOPMENT 59, 64 (Paul de Waart et al. eds., 1988) (“The
principle of permanent sovereignty recognizes . . . the right of a host State to regulate and
exercise authority over, and supervise the activities of, foreign investors . . . within its
territorial jurisdiction.”).
87 ROLAND KLÄGER, FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT’ IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
LAW 76 (2011).
88 See Grand River Enterprises Six Nations, Ltd., et al. v. United States of America,
UNCITRAL, Award (redacted version), paras. 176, 208 (Jan. 12, 2011) (“[T]he content of
the obligation imposed by Article 1105 must be determined by reference to customary
international law, not to standards contained in other treaties or other NAFTA provisions, or
in other sources, unless those sources reflect relevant customary international law. . . .
Further, the concepts of ‘fair and equitable treatment’ and ‘full protection and security’ refer
to existing elements of customary international law regarding the treatment of aliens and do
not add to that standard . . . The language of Article 1105 does not state or suggest a blanket
prohibition on discrimination against alien investors’ investment, and one cannot assert such
a rule under customary international law. States discriminate against foreign investments,
often and in many ways, without being called to account for violating the customary

208

Minimum Standard of Treatment Under Customary International Law
42:189 (2022)

Notably, tribunals have held that the principle of non-discrimination
constitutes an essential element of the FET standard, just like the doctrine
of legitimate expectation.89 Considering that the only rational connection
between the MST standard and the doctrine of legitimate expectation is the
notion that the FET standard as a whole has attained a status as customary
international law, this common-sense finding by the Grand River tribunal
also counters the notion that the doctrine of legitimate expectation has now
attained customary international law status.
Furthermore, states’ understanding of the MST standard as expressly
captured in several investment treaties also undermines the notion that the
MST standard now encompasses the FET standard. For example, the FTC’s
Notes on the interpretation of Article 1105(1) of NAFTA, which served to
change the definition of the MST in the very same clause from that of
“international law” to that of “customary international law,”90 specifies that
“[t]he concepts of ‘fair and equitable treatment’ . . . do not require treatment
in addition to or beyond that which is required by the customary
international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens.”91 Likewise,
paragraph 2 of Article 11.5 of the Korea-United States Free Trade
Agreement (“KORUS FTA”) explicitly provides that “[t]he concepts of
‘fair and equitable treatment’” as part of the MST “do not require treatment
in addition to or beyond that which is required by [the customary
international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens], and do not
create additional substantive rights.” The MST provisions of the KORUS
FTA were further amended on January 1, 2019, inserting the following new
paragraph: “[f]or greater certainty, the mere fact that a Party takes or fails to
take an action that may be inconsistent with an investor’s expectations does
not constitute a breach of this Article, even if there is loss or damage to the
covered investment as a result.”92 Accordingly, under this revised fourth
paragraph of Article 11.5, a failure to meet investors’ legitimate
minimum standard of protection.”).
89 See UNCTAD FET, supra note 4, at 81-82 (“Tribunals have held that the FET
standard prohibits discriminatory treatment of foreign investors and their investments.”). See
also Saluka Partial Award, supra note 58, para. 461; Loewen Group, Inc. and Raymond L.
Loewen v. United States of America, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, Award, para. 123
(June 26, 2003); Waste Mgmt. II Award, supra note 16, para. 98; CMS Award, supra note
63, para. 287. There could also be a technical overlap between the principle of nondiscrimination and the doctrine of legitimate expectation depending on circumstances.
90 Chad D. Hansen, Mondev International LTD. v. United States: A Case Study of the
Potential Risks of NAFTA’s Ever-Expanding Arbitration Provisions, 29 N.C. J. INT’L L. &
COM. REG. 351, 385-86 (2003).
91 NAFTA FTC, supra note 35.
92 Protocol between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the Republic of Korea Amending the Free Trade Agreement between the
United
States
of
America
and
the
Republic
of
Korea,
para. 4(2) (Sept. 3, 2018), https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/agreements/FTA/KORUS/
KORUS%20Protocol%20Amending%20Agreement%20-%20Signed.pdf (emphasis added).
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expectations does not violate the customary MST standard.93 This
amendment in the KORUS FTA is basically mirrored in Article 14.6 of
NAFTA’s successor, the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement
(USMCA). These newest provisions specifically rule out any room for
interpretative expansion of the MST beyond the customary international
law standard. Most remarkably, the contracting states of these major treaties
have manifestly differentiated the customary MST standard from the
autonomous FET standard, by expressly excluding the “basic touchstone”
of the FET standard, which is the doctrine of legitimate expectation, from
the scope of the MST standard.
The USMCA as well as the amended KORUS FTA or the previous
NAFTA Notes all refer to the customary international law standard of
minimum treatment, instead of creating any autonomous obligation through
treaty language.94 The descriptions embedded in these treaty provisions
directly reveal the contracting states’ understanding (and opinio juris so to
speak) of what constitutes the MST standard under customary international
law. The contracting states of these key treaties, as well as of many other
investment treaties with similar clauses,95 have repeatedly and specifically
93 Congressional Research Service, U.S.-South Korea (KORUS) FTA, IN FOCUS,
IF10733, at 1 (Dec. 28, 2018), https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/2018-12-28_IF10733_
5414a2917e96d62b72baed8eaa55b54b44fbedea.pdf.
94 For example, Annex 14-A (entitled “Customary International Law”) of the USMCA,
according to which Article 14.6 (entitled “Minimum Standard of Treatment”) must be
interpreted, stipulates that “[t]he Parties confirm their shared understanding that ‘customary
international law’ generally and as specifically referenced in Article 14.6 (Minimum
Standard of Treatment) results from a general and consistent practice of States that they
follow from a sense of legal obligation.”
95 One other example can be found in Article 5 of the 2012 U.S. Model BIT. Its first
paragraph provides that: “Each Party shall accord to covered investments treatment in
accordance with customary international law, including fair and equitable treatment and full
protection and security.” The second paragraph states, in relevant part, that: “For greater
certainty, paragraph 1 prescribes the customary international law minimum standard of
treatment of aliens as the minimum standard of treatment to be afforded to covered
investments. The concepts of ‘fair and equitable treatment’ and ‘full protection and security’
do not require treatment in addition to or beyond that which is required by that standard, and
do not create additional substantive rights.” Article 2 of the Korea-Uruguay BIT (2009)
provides almost the same provisions in its second and third paragraphs. Its second paragraph
stipulates that: “[e]ach Contracting Party shall accord to investments of an investor of the
other Contracting Party treatment in accordance with customary international law, including
fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security.” The third paragraph begins
with the following sentences that: “For greater certainty, paragraph 2 prescribes the
customary international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens as the minimum
standard of treatment to be afforded to investments of an investor of the other Contracting
Party. The concepts of ‘fair and equitable treatment’ and ‘full protection and security’ do not
require treatment in addition to or beyond that which is required by that standard, and do not
create additional substantive rights.” Similarly, Article 6 of the 2014 Canadian Model
Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement states in the first paragraph that:
“[e]ach Party shall accord to covered investment treatment in accordance with the customary
international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens, including fair and equitable
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confirmed their understanding that the MST does not include the doctrine
of legitimate expectation.
To conclude, while the FET standard certainly covers the MST
standard, it does not work vice versa. Customary international law’s MST
standard, as it stands today, does not seem to include the doctrine of
legitimate expectation.
III. DETERMINING BREACH OF THE CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW STANDARD OF MINIMUM TREATMENT
A. The Conundrum: Burden of Proof
If the customary MST standard is different from the autonomous FET
standard, what exactly is the MST standard applicable to foreign investors
or foreign investments? As previously discussed, the Neer Commission
considered that treatment of foreigners that is “outrageous,” “in bad faith,”
“willful neglect of duty,” or “insufficiency of governmental action so far
short of international standards that every reasonable and impartial man
would readily recognize its insufficiency” would fail to live up to the MST
standard.96 Tribunals and commentators are generally in agreement that this
very high standard of 1926 must have evolved thereafter, especially in light
of the significant evolution of international law in the field of the rights of
individuals, and that broader protection is now granted to foreign investors
by virtue of the MST standard.97 The difficult part, however, is ascertaining
the precise content of the customary MST standard applicable to foreign
investors or investments as of today.98
Various investment tribunals including the tribunal in Glamis
considered that the burden of solving this conundrum rests on claimants.
According to the tribunal in Glamis, while in some cases “the evolution of
custom may be so clear as to be found by the tribunal itself,” in most cases
treatment and full protection and security.” Its second paragraph confirms that: “[t]he
concepts of ‘fair and equitable treatment’ and ‘full protection and security’ in paragraph 1 do
not require treatment in addition to or beyond that which is required by the customary
international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens.”
96 Neer Award, supra note 43, para. 4.
97 See, e.g., Merrill Award, supra note 48, paras. 201, 213; Gold Award, supra note 50,
para. 567; Anglo Award, supra note 50, para. 442; Devas Award on Jurisdiction and Merits,
supra note 50, para. 457; Waste Mgmt. II Award, supra note 16, paras. 92-93, 98; Mobil
Arg. Decision on Jurisdiction and Liab., supra note 17, para. 910.
98 Relatively speaking, not many customary international laws have been developed in
the field of international economics or international investment. See Haneul Jung,
Expansibility of State Responsibility in Investor-State Dispute Settlement: Pre-visiting the
“Elliot Case”, 61(1) THE KOREAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 222, 226 n.19 (2016)
(S. Kor.) (available in Korean) (citing Patrick Dumberry, Are BITs Representing the “New”
Customary International Law in International Investment Law?, 28 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV.
675 (2010); and Jean d’Aspremont, International Customary Investment Law: Story of a
Paradox, ACIL RES. PAPER No. 2011-08 (2011).
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“the burden of doing so falls clearly on the party” asserting what constitutes
the currently applicable MST standard.99 Likewise, the tribunals in Cargill
v. Mexico and Methanex v. U.S.A. considered that “where a custom is not
clear, or is disputed, then it is for the party asserting the custom to establish
the content of that custom”; as such, the burden of proving changes in a
custom “falls clearly on the Claimant.”100 There is also a view that as long
as the existence of applicable customary international law is undisputed the
burden of ascertaining the standard of that customary law rests on both
claimants and respondents invoking that standard.101
In general, investment tribunals appear to agree that the initial burden
rests upon claimants under MST-incorporating investment treaties to
establish prima facie cases of their claims by proving (i) what specific
elements constitute the MST standard as it stands today, and (ii) whether
and how that standard has been breached by the host state. At first glance,
this straightforward conclusion seems to be free of error. As confirmed by
the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in US–Wool
Shirts and Blouses, “it is a generally-accepted canon of evidence in civil
law, common law and, in fact, most jurisdictions, that the burden of proof
rests upon the party, whether complaining or defending, who asserts the
affirmative of a particular claim or defense.”102 Further, the “normal
99

Glamis Award, supra note 52, para 21.
Cargill Award, supra note 51, paras. 271, 273 (“The Tribunal acknowledges that the
proof of change in a custom is not an easy matter to establish. However, the burden of doing
so falls clearly on Claimant. If Claimant does not provide the Tribunal with the proof of such
evolution, it is not the place of the Tribunal to assume this task. Rather the Tribunal, in such
an instance, should hold that Claimant fails to establish the particular standard asserted.”).
See also Methanex Corp. v. United States of America, Final Award of the Tribunal on
Jurisdiction and Merits, para. 26 in Part IV (United Nations Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law
Aug. 3, 2005) (“Customary international law has established exceptions to this broad rule
and has decided that some differentiations are discriminatory. But the International Court of
Justice has held that ‘[t]he Party which relies on a custom of this kind must prove that this
custom is established in such a manner that it has become binding on the other Party.’”).
101 Windstream Energy LLC v. Government of Canada, Case No. 2013-22, Award, para.
350 (Perm. Ct. Arb. Sept. 27, 2016) (“The Tribunal agrees that it is in the first place for the
party asserting that a particular rule of customary international law exists to prove the
existence of the rule. However, in the present case the issue is not whether the relevant rule
of customary international law exists; the minimum standard of treatment contained in
Article 1105(1) of NAFTA is indeed a rule of customary international law, as interpreted by
the FTC in its Notes of Interpretation. The issue therefore is not whether the rule exists, but
rather how the content of a rule that does exist – the minimum standard of treatment in
Article 1105(1) of NAFTA – should be established. The Tribunal is therefore unable to
accept the Respondent’s argument that the burden of proving the content of the rule falls
exclusively on the Claimant. In the Tribunal’s view, it is for each Party to support its
position as to the content of the rule with appropriate legal authorities and evidence.”).
102 See Appellate Body Report, United States–Measure Affecting Imports of Woven Wool
Shirts and Blouses from India, ¶ 14, WTO Doc. WT/DS33/AB/R (adopted May 23, 1997).
The Appellate Body went on to further explain that: “If that party adduces evidence
sufficient to raise a presumption that what is claimed is true, the burden then shifts to the
100
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international legal standard” applicable to “any adversarial proceedings”
requires that a complainant or claimant must initially establish a prima facie
case of its complaint or claim in order for them to have the burden of proof
(on defense) to shift to the respondent.103 However, the burden of proof
does not always attach to a claim or defense as a whole. Instead, a claim or
defense is separable between questions of facts and laws. An obligation to
adduce evidence to demonstrate a certain claim or defense is distinct from
the obligation to ascertain applicable legal standards. That legal obligation
ultimately rests upon competent tribunals of public international law.
According to the generally-accepted principle of jura novit curia (i.e., “the
court knows the laws”),104 international tribunals are under obligation to ex
officio ascertain the applicable law and relevant legal interpretation
irrespective of whether the parties to the dispute have or have not proffered
the correct legal test.105
other party, who will fail unless it adduces sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption.” Id.
103 See Appellate Body Report, European Communities–Measures Concerning Meat and
Meat Products (Hormones), ¶ 98, WTO Doc. WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R (adopted
Feb. 13, 1998). See also Panel Report, United States – Measures Affecting Trade in Large
Civil Aircraft (Second Complaint), ¶ 7.13, WTO Doc. WT/DS353/R (adopted Mar. 23,
2012) (“We have also kept in mind that a prima facie case is one which, in the absence of
effective refutation by the other party, requires a panel, as a matter of law, to rule in favor of
the party presenting the prima facie case . . . The normal international legal standards
governing the discharge of the burden of proof unquestionably apply to the WTO dispute
settlement procedures as an important element of its functions concerning dispute resolution
under the rule of law and due process.”).
104 AARON X. FELLMETH & MAURICE HORWITZ, GUIDE TO LATIN IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
147 (2009) (defining the term iura novit curia (i.e., jura novit curia) as “[a] doctrine
providing that, because a tribunal is presumed to know and apply the law, the parties to a
dispute are not required to invoke all applicable legal rules explicitly or to convince the
tribunal of the law’s content. A major implication of this doctrine is that a judicial or arbitral
tribunal is not bound by the construction of the law or legal instrument proposed by any of
the parties to the dispute.”).
105 See Appellate Body Report, European Communities–Conditions for the Granting of
Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries, ¶¶ 104-05, WTO Doc. WT/DS246/AB/R
(adopted April 20, 2004) (“As a general rule, the burden of proof for an ‘exception’ falls on
the respondent, that is, as the Appellate Body stated in US–Wool Shirts and Blouses, on the
party ‘assert[ing] the affirmative of a particular . . . defense.’ From this allocation of the
burden of proof, it is normally for the respondent, first, to raise the defense and, second, to
prove that the challenged measure meets the requirement of the defense provision. We are
therefore of the view that the European Communities must prove that the Drug
Arrangements satisfy the conditions set out in the Enabling Clause. Consistent with the
principle of jura novit curia, it is not the responsibility of the European Communities to
provide us with the legal interpretation to be given to a particular provision in the Enabling
Clause; instead, the burden of the European Communities is to adduce sufficient evidence to
substantiate its assertion that the Drug Arrangements comply with the requirements of the
Enabling Clause.”). See also Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua
(Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, 25 ¶ 29 (June 27) (“It being the duty of the Court
itself to ascertain and apply the relevant law in the given circumstances of the case, the
burden of establishing or proving rules of international law cannot be imposed upon any of
the parties, for the law lies within the judicial knowledge of the Court.”); Fisheries
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The problem is that ascertaining the MST standard inevitably involves
adducing evidence for the existence and content of the relevant custom,
which is essentially a question of fact. Nevertheless, that does not detract
from the reality that the MST standard is a legal standard, and ascertaining
its content is a question of law. It follows that the burden of ascertaining the
correct legal test for the MST ultimately rests upon investment tribunals,
even if each tribunal’s ability to ascertain the MST standard will have to be
bound by the ability of the parties to the dispute to adduce the relevant
evidence of the evolved custom. As a practical matter, therefore,
ascertaining the MST standard applicable to the given facts of a case
requires a joint effort by both the tribunal and parties.
Yet “the proof of change in a custom is not an easy matter to
establish”106 to say the least, especially in the field of international
investment law. Parties and tribunals have always struggled in ascertaining
specific elements of the MST standard beyond what was found in the Neer
case back in 1926; a pragmatic guidance on this topic will certainly benefit
the international investment dispute system as a whole.
B. A Pragmatic Guidance on Ascertaining the Legal Tests Applicable to
the Customary Minimum Standard of Treatment
A sound first step for solving this complex riddle would be putting the
issue in the proper perspective. Even if no one disputes that treaty and
customary international law are two different sources of international law,
too often do tribunals and commentators place and evaluate the FET and
MST on the same plane. However, a customary international law exists
separately (although not entirely independently) from international treaties.
To the extent that an investment treaty merely incorporates a customary
international law (such as the MST) by way of making reference without
adding or diminishing any content thereof, the incorporation merely builds
a nexus between the treaty and the customary international law existing
outside the four corners of the treaty. As an example, although an aggrieved
foreign investor would not have a direct standing to bring a claim against
the host state under general international law, a treaty-based standing can be
extended to the investor by an investment treaty with an investor-state
dispute settlement procedure. As the tribunal in KT Asia v. Kazakhstan
Jurisdiction Case (U.K. v. Ice.), Judgment, 1974 I.C.J. 3, 9, ¶ 17 (July 25); FELLMETH &
HORWITZ, supra note 104 (citing Velásquez Rodríguez Case for the principle of iura novit
curia); Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras, Merits, Judgement, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
No. 4, ¶ 163 (July 29, 1988) (“The precept contained [in Article I(1) of the American
Convention on Human Rights] constitutes the generic basis of the protection of the rights
recognized by the Convention and would be applicable, in any case, by virtue of a general
principle of law, iura novit curia, on which international jurisprudence has repeatedly relied
and under which a court has the power and the duty to apply the juridical provisions relevant
to a proceeding, even when the parties do not expressly invoke them.”).
106 Cargill Award, supra note 51, para 271.
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properly confirmed, but for the triangular relationship established by the
investment treaty among the investor, the state of the investor’s nationality,
and the host state, “the investor would have no right to bring a claim against
the [host] state” for any violation of the treaty.107 Indeed, under investment
treaties that provide only state-to-state dispute settlement procedure but not
investor-state dispute settlement procedure,108 aggrieved investors would in
principle have no standing to institute an international lawsuit for a breach
of the treaty against the host state.109 This truth holds even more so for a
107 KT Asia Investment Group B.V. v. Republic of Kazakhstan, ICSID Case No.
ARB/09/8, Award, ¶ 143 (Oct. 17, 2013) (“There is no doubt that it is the investor which
asserts its claim in investment arbitration, which distinguishes the latter from diplomatic
protection. Yet, that does not mean that there is no bond of nationality in investor-state
arbitration. There is a bond defined by the investment treaty. But for that bond, the investor
would have no right to bring a claim against the other state. In that sense, there is a triangular
relationship in investment treaty arbitration that is different from the one which exists in
matters of diplomatic protection under customary international law.”).
108 Some BITs have only the state-to-state dispute settlement procedure but not the
investor-state dispute settlement procedure. Michele Potestà, State-to-State Dispute
Settlement Pursuant to Bilateral Investment Treaties: Is There Potential?, in INTERNATIONAL
COURTS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF TULLIO
TREVES 753, 754 (Nerina Boschiero et al. eds., 2013). Today most investment treaties
include both state-to-state and investor-state dispute settlement procedures, but still some of
the recent investment chapters in comprehensive trade and investment treaties do not contain
investor-state dispute settlement procedures, while providing for state-to-state dispute
settlement
procedures
only.
NATHALIE
BERNASCONI-OSTERWALDER,
STATESTATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN INVESTMENT TREATIES 1 (2014), https://www.iisd.org/sites/d
efault/files/publications/best-practices-state-state-dispute-settlement-investment-treaties.pdf.
Examples of investment treaties without investor-state dispute settlement procedures include
Germany-Pakistan BIT (1959), Korea-Pakistan BIT (1988), Australia-United States FTA
(2004), Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement (2006), Australia-Malaysia
FTA (2012) and the United States-Canada investment relationship in the USMCA (2020).
109 Counsel may attempt to incorporate investor-state dispute settlement procedure from
other investment treaties by relying on most-favored nation (MFN) treatment clauses of the
underlying investment treaty. The outcome of such an attempt would depend on various
factors including the arbitrators’ personal viewpoint(s) on the applicability of MFN clauses
or the specific language constituting the relevant MFN clauses. Several tribunals held that
the MFN treatment concerns treatment to the investment, and as such, it relates to
substantive, rather than procedural, rights of the investors. See, e.g., Plama Consortium
Limited v. Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶¶
191-92 (Feb. 8, 2005); Telenor Mobile Communications A.S. v. The Republic of Hungary,
ICSID Case No. ARB/04/15, Award (Sept. 13, 2006). At the same time, several other
tribunals held that there is no conceptual limitation of an MFN clause so as not to apply it to
procedural rights. See, e.g., Austrian Airlines v. The Slovak Republic, Final Award,
UNCITRAL, ¶ 124 (Oct. 9, 2009); RosInvestCo UK Ltd. V. The Russian Federation, SCC
Case No. V079/2005, Award on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 130-32 (Oct. 1, 2007). Against this
backdrop, tribunals would be inclined to rely on the explicit language of the applicable MFN
clause (e.g., a clause applying the MFN to “all matters” would have more chance of being
considered as applicable to dispute settlement provisions as well). See, e.g., Emilio Agustín
Maffezini v. The Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Decision of the Tribunal
on Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 49, 54-56, 64 (Jan. 25, 2000). However, this makes no
difference for the purpose of the discussion in this paper, because an MFN clause is a treaty
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claim arising out of customary international law. In this sense, the primary
purpose of codifying the MST standard in an investment treaty is to allow
private investors to bring claims against the host state for breaches of the
customary MST standard through the treaty’s investor-state dispute
settlement procedure. Otherwise, the investors would have no standing or
recourse against the host state for violation of the MST standard. The
foregoing reality informs a pragmatic starting point for evaluation of an
investor’s claim arising out of the MST standard–taking the shoes of the
state of the investor’s nationality, from which the investor’s right to the
claim originates.
Basically, the MST was developed to respond to situations where
national treatment provided inadequate protection for aliens and their
property, and was intended to function in a schema of state-to-state dispute
settlement, organized as the mechanism of diplomatic protection.110 In fact,
the United States in Neer sought to exercise its diplomatic protection
against Mexico.111 A breach of the customary MST vis-à-vis a foreign
investor would provide a legitimate basis for the exercise of diplomatic
protection by the state of the investor’s nationality against the host state,
with or without an underlying investment treaty.112 Conversely, an
internationally wrongful act of the host state, which is deemed to be serious
enough to induce the state of the investor’s nationality to exercise
diplomatic protection against the host state, may (although not always or
necessarily) also give rise to the investor’s claim under the investment
treaty, including the MST claim (if so raised), especially if the wrongful act
caused “significant injury” to the investor within the meaning of Article 19
of the Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection.113
provision just like an investor-state dispute settlement provision. An investor would have no
standing against the host state but for a treaty provision granting such a standing, in one way
or the other.
110 Margaret Clare Ryan, Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. The United States and the Fair and
Equitable Treatment Standard, 56 MCGILL L.J. 919, 955 (2011).
111 CAMPBELL MCLACHLAN, LAURENCE SHORE & MATTHEW WEINIGER, INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: SUBSTANTIVE PRINCIPLES 215-17 (2007).
112 Gloria L. Sandrino, The NAFTA Investment Chapter and Foreign Direct Investment
in Mexico: A Third World Perspective, 27 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 259, 265-66 (1994)
(“The law of state responsibility of injury to aliens and alien property . . . underlies the
traditional principles of customary international law. This doctrine emphasizes restricting the
extent to which the host state can interfere with private property, thereby protecting the
private property of aliens. In this regard, a breach of the international minimum standard
‘provides a legitimate basis for the exercise by the home State of the right of diplomatic
protection of the alien.’”).
113 Article 2 of the Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection stipulates that “[a] State has
the right to exercise diplomatic protection in accordance with the present draft articles.”
Commentary to Article 2 explains that exercise of diplomatic protection by the state of
nationality is discretionary, as stated as follows: “A State has the right to exercise diplomatic
protection on behalf of a national. It is under no duty or obligation to do so. The internal law
of a State may oblige a State to extend diplomatic protection to a national, but international
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For the avoidance of doubt, this certainly does not mean that all
internationally wrongful acts establishing basis for exercising diplomatic
protection would amount to a breach of the MST standard. Rather, such
patterns of exercising diplomatic protection by states can establish
pragmatic reference points, as opposed to standalone legal standards, for
examination of MST claims. That is, if the fact before an investment
tribunal is similar to a pattern that gives rise to invocation of diplomatic
protection by states, the tribunal might also want to assess if such sovereign
interventions are triggered by any “sense of legal obligation” to do so. If the
answer turns out to be “yes,” then the tribunal and parties would have a
good starting point to evaluate the MST claim in question through the prism
of customary international law.
The difficulty of proving the content of the MST standard in the
context of an investor-state dispute always rests on a lack of relevant
precedent that can serve as evidence of evolved custom and prevailing
opinio juris. In contrast, a large number of relevant precedents can be found
in the context of state-to-state disputes triggered by states’ exercise of
diplomatic protection.114 An abundance of precedents in numerous
law imposes no such obligation.” Article 19 of the Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection
nevertheless specifies that “[a] State entitled to exercise diplomatic protection . . . should . . .
give due consideration to the possibility of exercising diplomatic protection, especially when
a significant injury has occurred.” The “significance” of the injury invoking Article 19 must
not be limited to the seriousness of the injury itself and must also concern seriousness of the
violation that caused injury. This understanding is supported by Commentary to Article 19,
which discusses a “human rights” violation as the primary example of such significant
injury. As explained earlier, the MST standard covers “human rights” and more.
114 See, e.g., John R. Dugard, First Report on Diplomatic Protection, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/506 & Add. 1, ¶ 10 (2000) (“There is much practice and precedent
on diplomatic protection.”), https://legal.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/a_cn4_506.pdf;
John R. Dugard, Introductory Note for Articles on Diplomatic Protection, U.N.
AUDIOVISUAL LIBR. INT’L L. (2006) (“[D]iplomatic protection remains a mechanism of
international law that is still employed by States to secure just treatment for their nationals
abroad.”), https://legal.un.org/avl/ha/adp/adp.html; Bruce W. Klaw, State Responsibility for
Bribe Solicitation and Extortion: Obligations, Obstacles, and Opportunities, 33 BERKELEY J.
INT’L L. 60, 100-01 (2015) (“By treaty and under customary international law, injured
natural and legal persons generally may request from the State of their nationality, and their
State may give, diplomatic protection against an act or omission by a foreign State . . . .
Diplomatic protection has long been used as a means of obtaining redress for violations of
international law, including for economic injuries to nationals of the home State.”); Anthea
Roberts, State-to-State Investment Treaty Arbitration: A Hybrid Theory of Interdependent
Rights and Shared Interpretive Authority, 55 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 17, 30 (2014) (“General
rules about diplomatic protection can be superseded by particular treaty provisions, but
investment treaties typically permit investor-state arbitration without ruling out diplomatic
protection claims. [] The most obvious form of state-to-state claims are diplomatic
protection claims where the home state initiates arbitration with respect to treaty violations
affecting its nationals.”). See also Mavromattis Palestine Concessions (Greece v. Gr. Brit.),
Judgment, 1924 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 3, ¶ 21 (Aug. 30) (“It is an elementary principle of
international law that a State is entitled to protect its subjects, when injured by acts contrary
to international law committed by another State, from whom they have been unable to obtain
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situations in which diplomatic protection has been exercised by states via
various judicial and non-judicial means can serve as an effective source of
evidence for both the existence and content of the evolved custom (as well
as for opinio juris, for that matter), which, in turn, can inform and guide
tribunals’ assessments of an MST claim.115
IV. CONCLUSION
Although the ICJ in Bolivia v. Chile effectively rejected the notion that
the doctrine of legitimate expectation has attained customary international
law status, even the judgment of the “World Court” does not seem to have
settled the longstanding controversies surrounding the nature and legal
status of the doctrine. As explained in this paper, however, the principal
reasoning of the investment tribunals that endorsed the MST standard’s
status as customary international law, viz. the requisite state practice and
opinio juris are demonstrated by the prevalence of the investment treaties
codifying the FET standard, does not seem to withstand the scrutiny.
In the meantime, the divergence between the awards rendered by
certain investment tribunals and the manifested intent of the contracting
states on interpretation of the MST standard has reached a new height. In
satisfaction through ordinary channels. By taking up the case of one of its subjects and by
resorting to diplomatic action or international judicial proceedings on its behalf, a State is in
reality asserting its own rights – its rights to ensure, in the person of its subjects, respect for
the rules of international law.”), http://www.worldcourts.com/pcij/eng/decisions/1924.
08.30_mavrommatis.htm; The Case Concerning Barcelona Traction, Light and Power
Company, Limited (Belg. v. Spain), Judgment, 1970 I.C.J. 3 (2d Phase), ¶ 78 (Feb. 5) (“The
Court would here observe that, within the limits prescribed by international law, a State may
exercise diplomatic protection by whatever means and to whatever extent it thinks fit, for it
is its own right that the State is asserting.”).
115 It must be clarified that this paper does not intend to, and in fact does not need to,
engage with a separate set of discussions about the relationship between states’ rights to
exercise diplomatic protection and investors’ rights to institute investment arbitrations under
investment treaties. There is a whole host of arbitral awards and scholarly works on this
topic. As an example, the tribunal in ADM v. Mexico considered that the investment treaties
prescribe “substantive obligations which remain inter-State, without accruing individual
rights,” and that a claimant in an investor-state dispute settlement procedure is “in reality
stepping into the shoes and asserting the rights of the home State.” See Archer Daniels
Midland Company and Tate & Lyle Ingredients Americas, Inc. v. The United Mexican
States, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/04/5, Award, ¶ 168 (Nov. 21, 2007). However, the
tribunal in Corn Products v. Mexico considered that the substantive rights conferred upon
the investors under the investment treaties are separate and distinct from those of the State of
which they are nationals by highlighting the elemental differences between exercising
diplomatic protection and instituting investor-state arbitration. See generally Corn Products
International, Inc. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/04/1, Decision on
Responsibility (redacted version) (Jan. 15, 2008). Without any implication beyond what is
relevant herein, on this point the authors simply acknowledge that a beneficiary’s means of
pursuing its international rights as an individual can and will differ from the way that the
same right can be pursued by the benefactor as a sovereign nation. That does not, however,
stand in tension with the presupposition that the factual precedents of diplomatic protection
can serve as a helpful source and guidance in evaluating an MST claim.
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2015, the European Union, during its negotiation with the United States on
the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), proposed a
novel dispute settlement mechanism under the TTIP’s investment
chapter.116 According to the European Union’s textual proposal, a new
court system is to be established to resolve disputes between investors and
states, expressly requiring that judges in this so-called Investment Court
System “shall have demonstrated expertise in public international law,”117
in contrast to the existing investor-state dispute settlement system, where
arbitrators do not necessarily have to possess any knowledge of public
international law.118 The requirement of public international law expertise is
supposedly meant to ensure that public international law perspectives,
which states and critics argue have been lacking,119 are duly represented in
investment tribunals. Likely underlying this interesting yet alarming
development is the controversies surrounding the doctrine of legitimate
expectation, wherein numerous instances the doctrine has been invoked to
challenge the exercise of sovereign powers.120 Certainly, the demonstrated
lack of confidence by major states in an international dispute settlement
mechanism as active as investment treaty arbitration is deeply concerning.
In defense of the investment tribunals that endorsed the customary
international law status of the doctrine of legitimate expectation,
establishing a legal test for the MST standard is a daunting task. While
tribunals are burdened with the ultimate responsibility to ascertain the legal
test for the MST by virtue of the principle of jura novit curia, as a practical
matter, tribunals’ evaluations are inevitably limited in scope by the
evidence adduced by parties of evolved custom and opinio juris. It is
116 This proposal is aligned with the European Commission’s press release in September
2015, proposing the creation of a public permanent multilateral investment court that would
comprise standing first instance and appeals facilities, as an alternative to the traditional
investor-state dispute settlement mechanism. European Commission Press Release
IP/15/5651, Commission Proposes New Investment Court System for TTIP and Other EU
Trade and Investment Negotiations (Sept. 16, 2015), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP15-5651_en.htm (proposing an “Investment Court System” that would replace investor-state
dispute settlement in “all ongoing and future EU investment negotiations, including the
[TTIP]” and eventually all “EU agreements, EU Member States’ agreements with third
countries and . . . trade and investment treaties concluded between non-EU countries”).
117 Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, Chapter II - Investment of the
European Union’s Proposal for Investment Protection and Resolution of Investment
Disputes, § 3, arts. 9(4), 10(7), Nov. 12, 2015, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/
november/tradoc_153955.pdf.
118 Frank Emmert & Begaiym Esenkulova, Why Can’t We Be Friends? Protecting
Investors While Also Protecting Legitimate Public Interests and the Sustainable
Development of Host Countries in Investor-State Arbitration, 48 TEX. J. BUS. L. 48, 80
(2019).
119 Catherine A. Rogers, Apparent Dichotomies, Covert Similarities: A Response to Joost
Pauwelyn, 109 AM. J. INT’L. L. UNBOUND 294, 297 (2016).
120 TEERAWAT WONGKAEW, PROTECTION OF LEGITIMATE EXPECTATIONS IN INVESTMENT
TREATY ARBITRATION: A THEORY OF DETRIMENTAL RELIANCE 8 (2019).
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difficult to fault tribunals when the guidance on evidence production is
completely lacking. As explained in this paper, the rich precedents of
diplomatic protection could serve as a helpful source of evidence for
proving the existence and content of the relevant custom or opinio juris.
Such an evidentiary basis can inform and guide tribunals and parties in
ascertaining the legal tests applicable to the MST claims.
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